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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect of banking liberalization on debt structure in a sample of 
firms in 37 developed and developing countries. Banking liberalization increases on 
average debt availability and reduces its maturity. Debt availability increases in 
countries with stronger supervision and lower protection of creditor and property 
rights. The reduction in debt maturity is greater in developed countries. The effect of 
banking liberalization also varies across firm size. Small firms in developed countries 
and large firms in developing countries benefit least from banking liberalization. 
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Banking liberalization and firms’ debt structure: 
International evidence 
1. Introduction 
The progressive liberalization of financial activity over the last two decades has 
attracted the attention of the financial literature. Its advocates emphasize the 
positive effects it has on economic growth by increasing credit availability and 
improving investment allocation (Bekaert et al., 2005; Galindo et al., 2007; 
Gehringer, 2013). Its opponents highlight that financial liberalization increases risks 
and, therefore, financial fragility (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The current 
financial crisis makes it especially relevant to gain a better understanding of the 
benefits and costs associated with financial liberalization. This paper offers new 
empirical evidence on the potential benefits of banking liberalization on the credit 
channel. We focus on how banking liberalization modifies firms’ debt structure 
(availability and maturity) and on how bank supervision, investor protection, and 
firm size shape the influence of banking liberalization and give rise to differences 
between developed and developing countries. 
The theoretical and empirical literature on financial liberalization does not provide 
unambiguous predictions and results. The empirical evidence, moreover, has 
focused on different aspects of financial liberalization in developing countries.1 
Empirical literature focus on developing countries because financial liberalization 
can help develop the domestic financial system in these countries and facilitate the 
access of firms to mature financial markets. These benefits would be lower in 
developed countries (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006). 
                                                 
1 Basically, there have been three aspects of financial liberalization that have attracted interest: the 
effects of capital account openness (see Eichengreen, 2001 for a survey), equity market liberalization 
(see, for example, Bekaert et al., 2001, 2005, 2006), and banking liberalization (Laeven, 2003). 
 
 3 
However, there are also theoretical reasons for expecting a more negative effect of 
banking liberalization in developing countries and different effects on long and 
short-term debt. The literature on banking competition suggests that the influence 
of banking liberalization on firms’ access to credit through changes in market 
competition critically depends on the relevance of informational asymmetries. In 
perfect credit markets, higher competition increases the amount of credit and 
reduces its cost (Klein, 1971). However, models that incorporate asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers show that increases in credit market 
competition reduce lending (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). This is because, in 
markets with asymmetric information, increased competition reduces the benefits 
for banks of holding close lending relationships with their borrowers so reduces the 
ability of relationship banking to facilitate firms’ access to debt.  
The Law and Finance literature provides substantial empirical evidence indicating 
that financial development helps firms to grow faster by supplying more external 
funds and that a country’s financial development is related to its legal and 
institutional framework (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1997; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). Poor institutions and information disclosure characterize 
developing countries and may increase the intensity of information asymmetries 
(Levine et al., 2000; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). The presence of higher 
informational asymmetries in developing countries may mean that banking 
liberalization has more negative consequences on credit access for these countries 
because lending relationships are destroyed. Moreover, the literature on capital 
structure suggests that informational asymmetries are more relevant in long-term 
than in short-term debt and in small than in large firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Gaud et al., 2005; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006). 
Combining the above three strands of literature, we analyze if banking liberalization 
affects short and long-term debt differently, and how countries’ supervision, 
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investor protection, and firm size motivate different effects between developed and 
developing countries. We use an international panel database of a maximum of 
9,822 firms in 37 developing and developed countries over the 1995-2004 period. 
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we analyze the effect of banking 
liberalization not only on debt availability but also on its maturity. As problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection are specially relevant in long-term debt, we can 
expect a more negative or less positive impact of banking liberalization on long-
term debt. Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) have analyzed effects both on debt 
availability and maturity. However, they analyze seven emerging countries and use 
measures of stock market liberalization and financial globalization but do not focus 
on banking liberalization. 
Second, we analyze the interaction of banking liberalization with official and private 
bank supervision, and with investor protection in a country. International 
institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, are encouraging countries to strengthen both 
official and private bank supervision. These recommendations are frequently 
discussed in the context of increasing bank stability but, as far as we know, there 
are no studies analyzing the effects of the interaction between banking 
liberalization and supervisory policy on the credit supply. 
The literature on firms’ capital structure has used international databases to 
analyze the influence of investor protection and institutions. Empirical studies show 
that better protection of creditors increases both the availability and maturity of 
firms’ debt by reducing the adverse selection and moral hazard problems of debt 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Levine, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Antoniou et 
al., 2008; Bae and Goyal, 2009). Stronger protection of property rights, however, 
favors increased use of equity over debt (González and González, 2008; Jiraporn et 
al., 2012). As equity is subject to more problems of adverse selection and moral 
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hazard than debt, better protection of rights encourages the issue of equity and is, 
therefore, negatively related to firm leverage. To our knowledge, previous papers 
do not analyze how the protection of property and creditor rights modifies the 
effects of banking liberalization on firms’ debt structure and explains potential 
differences between developed and developing countries. 
Third, we analyze if banking liberalization affects small and large firms differently 
depending on countries’ development. If informational asymmetries are relevant for 
explaining the effects of banking liberalization on firms’ debt structure, the greater 
informational asymmetries in small firms may lead to different results depending on 
firm size. Empirical evidence reports mixed results depending on countries’ 
development. Laeven (2003) finds, in firms from 13 developing countries, that 
financial liberalization relaxes external financing constraints for small firms but 
increases them for large firms. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and Zarutskie 
(2006) suggest the opposite for US firms. They find that more competition among 
creditors damages availability of debt for small and young firms. We use our 
international database of developed and developing countries to analyze if 
countries’ development shapes the differential effect of banking liberalization 
between small and large firms. 
Finally, we account for dynamic processes in firm leverage using the generalized-
method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for 
dynamic panel data. GMM models are designed to handle autoregressive properties 
in the dependent variable (firm leverage) and control for the endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables and unobserved firm-specific characteristics. We also include 
country, industry, and time dummies to prevent the coefficients of supervisory and 
institutional variables from being biased by incorporating confusing effects of other 
omitted country variables. Galindo et al. (2007) use the GMM method to analyze 
the effect of financial liberalization on investment efficiency but, to our knowledge, 
this has not been used to analyze the effect on the credit channel. 
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In a closely related paper, Agca et al. (2008) assess the impact of both financial 
globalization and credit market deregulation on corporate leverage. They examine 
data from a large panel of publicly-traded non-financial firms in 38 countries over 
the period 1994-2002 and find that credit market globalization results in higher 
leverage, particularly in emerging markets. In contrast, they find that deregulation 
in domestic credit markets brings about a decline in leverage in emerging market 
firms and, to a smaller degree, an increase in leverage in advanced country firms. 
However, they do not analyze effects on debt maturity or how firm size, bank 
supervision or the protection of property and creditor rights shape the influence of 
banking liberalization across countries. Nor do they control for the partial 
adjustment process of firm leverage, unobserved firm effects, or the potential 
endogeneity of bank explanatory variables. 
Our results for a maximum of 9,822 firms in 37 countries indicate that on average 
banking liberalization increases firm leverage and reduces its maturity. However, 
these effects vary across firms and countries. The increase in debt availability is 
higher in countries with stronger official and private supervision, and lower 
protection of creditor and property rights. We find that banking liberalization 
reduces debt maturity more in developed countries. Moreover, we find that the 
effect of banking liberalization also depends on firm size. Larger firms in developing 
and smaller firms in developed countries benefit the least from banking 
liberalization. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the influence of 
banking liberalization on debt structure and the hypotheses tested in the paper. 
Section 3 describes the database, methodology, and main variables used in the 
paper. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
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The potential effects of banking liberalization have traditionally been associated 
with changes in bank market competition. Claessens and Laeven (2004) find in a 
sample of 50 countries that more strictly regulated bank markets are less 
competitive. Theoretically, the influence of greater bank competition on firms’ credit 
access depends on the intensity of information asymmetries. In a market without 
information asymmetries, an increase in competition would result in a lower price 
for credit and more credit availability (Klein, 1971). In markets with asymmetric 
information, however, an increase in banking competition may diminish banks’ 
incentives to invest in the acquisition of soft information by establishing close 
relationships with borrowers. Petersen and Rajan (1995), for instance, show that 
credit market competition imposes constraints on the ability of firms and creditors 
to intertemporally share surplus. Banks in less competitive markets may, however, 
lend with the expectation that they will recover the initial subsidy via higher 
interest rates in the future. As information asymmetries are higher in long-term 
than in short-term debt, lending relationships would be more valuable for long-term 
debt in less competitive markets. 
We therefore expect banking liberalization to have a different impact on short-term 
debt than on long-term debt. The lower informational asymmetries of short-term 
debt suggest that banking liberalization would bring down prices and make larger 
amounts of short-term debt available to firms. Moreover, greater competition that 
reduces bank charter value increases bank risk-taking incentives (Keeley, 1990) so 
is likely to encourage banks to finance new investments that they would not 
consider if they were behaving more cautiously. Both effects lead us to forecast 
greater availability of short-term debt for firms. 
The greater information asymmetries of long-term debt, however, lead to a less 
clear expansionary effect for banking liberalization on debt maturity. Banking 
liberalization may limit the interest rates that banks can charge in the future and 
prevent higher interest rates in the future from subsidizing lower interest rates in 
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the present. It basically reduces the ability to contract long-term debt. As the 
predicted positive impact on short-term debt is greater than for long-term debt, we 
can expect a reduction in firms’ debt maturity. Therefore, the impact of banking 
liberalization on debt availability will depend on whether or not the positive effect 
on short-term debt offsets the potential negative effect on long-term debt. 
Following the above arguments, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Banking liberalization has a more positive (less negative) effect on firms’ 
short-term debt than on long-term debt. 
The effect of banking liberalization on firms’ debt structure may also vary across 
countries depending on bank supervision and investor protection. If bank 
supervision affects the enforcement of bank regulation, we would expect greater 
effects from changes in bank regulation as private and official bank supervision 
becomes stronger. If a country’s bank supervision is weak, we would expect 
regulation to be less binding for banks and to reduce the potential impact of 
changes in banking regulations on firms’ debt structure. Although official 
supervision is specifically designed to enforce bank regulation, since Basel II, 
banking authorities have been aiming to reinforce both official and private 
supervision. For this reason, we include both types of supervision in the empirical 
analysis. Our second hypothesis is: 
H2: The influence of banking liberalization on debt structure is positively related to 
bank supervision in a country. 
The Law and Finance literature has highlighted the importance of creditor rights for 
increasing both the availability and the maturity of debt for firms (Levine, 1999; 
Giannetti, 2003; González and González, 2008; Antoniou et al., 2008) while better 
protection of property rights and corporate governance favor equity issues 
(González and González, 2008; Jiraporn et al., 2012). It is less clear, however, 
how investor protection complements or substitutes the effect of banking 
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liberalization on firms’ debt structure. On the one hand, if better protection of 
creditor rights makes debt more available, we might expect banking liberalization 
to have lower marginal benefits on debt availability and maturity. In this case, the 
protection of creditor rights and bank liberalization would be substitutes. On the 
other hand, banking liberalization cannot by itself facilitate bank loans to firms if 
regulation does not adequately protect creditor rights. In this case, better 
protection of creditor rights would complement banking liberalization to facilitate 
firms’ access to bank debt. 
Similarly, if better protection of property rights favors the use of equity versus 
debt, we might expect banking liberalization to have lower positive (higher 
negative) effects on debt in these environments. Protection of property rights and 
banking liberalization would then be substitutes. Better protection of property 
rights, however, might complement banking liberalization and increase (decrease) 
its positive (negative) effect on debt structure. Bae and Goyal (2010) show that 
corporate governance affects firms’ profits when countries liberalize their equity 
markets. Their results reveal that better-governed Korean firms experience higher 
abnormal returns, have more foreign ownership, and exhibit higher rates of 
physical capital accumulation following equity liberalization. As both types of 
relation are theoretically possible, we make no a priori forecast as to whether 
banking liberalization complements or substitutes the protection of creditor and 
property rights, and we treat it as an empirical issue. 
The influence of countries’ investor protection on the effects of bank liberalization 
on firms’ debt structure may differ between developed and developing countries. 
The Law and Finance literature suggests this link by stating that a country’s legal 
and institutional framework explains its financial and economic development (La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Poorer investor 
protection in developing countries would increase the relevance of information 
asymmetries in such countries and lead to more negative (less positive) 
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consequences for banking liberalization on firms’ debt structure. So, our third 
hypothesis is: 
H3: The influence of banking liberalization on debt structure is less positive (more 
negative) in developing countries. 
The influence of information asymmetries on the effects of banking liberalization 
may also differ between small and large firms. Small firms are characterized by 
larger informational asymmetries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 
2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Gaud et al., 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006) and 
greater dependence on bank financing for their investments. Large firms, on the 
contrary, have better access to domestic and international markets and are usually 
less dependent on domestic bank markets. So, the impact of banking liberalization 
on debt structure would be less positive or more negative in small firms. 
However, the effect of banking liberalization on debt structure according to firm size 
might be influenced by the country’s economic development. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994, 1995), Laeven (2003) and Zarutskie (2006) provide evidence on this. On 
the one hand, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and Zarutskie (2006), using data 
from US firms, find that more competition among creditors damages availability of 
debt for small and young firms. This suggests that more competition discourages 
creditors from lending to firms whose qualities are not well known and is consistent 
with the previously forecasted influence of firm size on the effect of banking 
liberalization on debt structure. On the other hand, Laeven (2003) finds the 
opposite result for a sample of firms from 13 developing countries. He shows that 
financial liberalization relaxes external financing constraints for small firms, but 
increases them for large ones. Because of these differences in the results, we 
analyze the interaction between country’s economic development and firm size. Our 
fourth hypothesis is: 
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H4: Firm size increases (reduces) the positive (negative) effect of banking 
liberalization on firms’ debt structure in developed countries. 
3. Database, methodology, and variables  
3.1. Database 
Firm data comes from the Worldscope database which contains financial statement 
data and stock prices from many countries in comparable form. We initially selected 
the 49 countries considered by La Porta et al. (1998) over the 1995-2004 period, 
but eliminated 12 of them because of scarce data: Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Zimbabwe. The final number of countries considered is therefore 37, including both 
developed and developing countries. 
We excluded firms whose capital decisions may reflect special factors: the financial 
industry (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and regulated enterprises (SIC codes 4000 – 
4999). Since we apply the GMM first-difference estimator with at least one lag of 
the dependent variable and two lags of the proxy for banking liberalization, firms 
without sufficient consecutive years were excluded. The final sample includes a 
maximum of 9,822 firms with 41,262 firm-year observations. 
3.2. Methodology 
We adopt the traditional dynamic model of capital structure. The model tests 
whether there is a leverage target and, if so, how quickly a firm moves toward the 
target. The form of the target adjustment model states that changes in the debt 
ratio (Dit – Dit-1) partially absorb the difference between the target leverage (Dit*) 
and lagged leverage (Dit-1):  
)()( 1
*
1   itititit DDDD                     (1) 
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where  measures the transaction costs that prevent complete adjustment to the 
target leverage. It varies between 0 and 1 and is inversely related to adjustment 
costs.  
As the target debt is unobservable, we model it as a linear function of the 
traditional determinants of capital structure as indicated by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), i.e., profitability (PROF), growth opportunities (GROWTH), tangible assets 
(PPE), and size (SIZE).2 Substituting these variables for D* in model [1], we get: 
  itititititit SIZEaPPEaGROWTHaPROFaDaD 432110     1      (2) 
As we used an international database, we incorporate country variables and the 
influence of banking liberalization. As estimations are carried out with panel data, 
our basic model is: 
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 Where i, j, k, and t denote firm, industry, country, and year, respectively. The main 
variable in our study is BFREEDOM. It is a proxy for banking liberalization in 
country k in year t. We include the current value and two lags of BFREEDOM to 
capture potential effects of banking liberalization over the long run.  
We include as a control variable the development of the corporate bond market as 
a percentage of private domestic debt over GDP (PRBOND).  This variable controls 
for potential substitution effects between bank debt and corporate bonds. In 
                                                 
2 Booth et al. (2001) and Delcoure (2007) also support the importance of these variables in explaining the 
capital structure of firms in developing countries. 
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countries where the corporate bond market is sufficiently developed, firms might 
substitute corporate bonds for bank loans and positively bias the estimated 
coefficients for banking liberalization. 
As additional control variables at country level we include three country 
characteristics previously incorporated in studies on firms’ capital structure with 
international data: bank market concentration (CONC), protection of property rights 
(RIGHTS), and protection of creditor rights (CREDITORS). As effective protection of 
rights requires both explicit legal protection and enforcement of the law, we interact 
RIGHTS and CREDITORS with a variable capturing law enforcement in countries 
(ENFORCE).  
Bank market concentration has usually been used as a proxy for bank market 
competition. As effects of banking liberalization may potentially be associated with 
changes in bank competition, we check if the influence of banking liberalization 
remains after controlling for bank concentration. We do not forecast a clear sign for 
b6 as the banking literature suggests a negative effect on firm leverage in perfect 
capital markets but a positive one in markets with asymmetric information 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). 
The protection of property rights is crucial to solve problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard in financial contracts (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). As equity 
issue is subject to more of these problems than debt, empirical evidence confirms 
that stronger protection of property rights favors increased use of equity over debt 
(González and González, 2008; Jiraporn et al., 2012). We therefore expect a 
negative sign for the coefficient of RIGHTSxENFORCE (b7). 
The literature on firms’ capital structure has found a positive relation between the 
protection of creditor rights and firms’ leverage, which is greater with long-term 
debt (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 
2007; González and González, 2008). We therefore include the interaction between 
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CREDITORS and ENFORCE as a control variable and expect a positive sign for this 
coefficient (b8). 
We include four specific effects: country-industry, industry-year, country-year, and 
firm-specific effects. The four sets of specific effects should control for most shocks 
affecting firm leverage. θkj is a country-industry specific effect to control not only 
for characteristics that are specific to either an industry or a country, but also for 
characteristics that are specific to an industry located in a particular country, as 
long as these are persistent over time. These include, for instance, the effect of 
persistent differences in size, concentration, financial frictions, external 
dependence, or government intervention and support, derived from different factor 
endowments, market size, or institutional characteristics that may generate 
different debt ratios across industries and countries. λjt is an industry-year specific 
effect to control for worldwide industry shocks. φkt is a country-year specific effect. 
It includes, for instance, the development of financial markets and bank credit, or 
aggregate country-specific shocks. This approach has the advantage that it is less 
likely to suffer from omitted variable bias or model specification than traditional 
regressions. Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2008) have previously used this approach to 
analyze the real effects of a banking crisis in an international sample of banks. 
Finally, εijkt is the error term. 
We extend the basic model to analyze how the influence of banking liberalization 
varies across countries depending on bank supervision, investor protection, and 
economic development.  We include an interaction term between banking freedom 
and each country variable (∑BFREEDOM x COUNTRYVAR). The inclusion of dummy 
country variables avoids the need for these supervisory and institutional country 
variables to enter the regression on their own and allows us to focus on the terms 
of their interaction with banking freedom. 
 15 
 
    +  + +  +  + 
 x   
     
    1 
ijktijkktjtkj
2
0m
 10
2
0m
 9
 8  765
432110













ktmtkmtk
ktktktktktkt
itititititit
COUNTRYVARBFREEDOMbBFREEDOMb
ENFORCExCREDITORSbENFORCExRIGHTSbCONCbPRBONDb
SIZEaPPEaGROWTHaPROFaDaD
(4) 
As country variables interacting with banking freedom we include official 
supervision (OFFICIAL), private supervision (MONITOR), protection of property 
(RIGHTS) and creditor (CREDITORS) rights, and economic development (DEV) in a 
country. 
We apply generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed for 
dynamic models of panel data by Arellano and Bond (1991). This methodology is 
specifically designed to address three particular econometric issues: (i) the 
presence of unobserved firm-specific effects, eliminated by taking first differences 
of the variables; (ii) the autoregressive process in the data regarding leverage ratio 
behavior (i.e., the need to use a lagged-dependent-variables model to capture the 
dynamic nature of the capital structure decisions); and (iii) the likely endogeneity 
of the explanatory variables. We control for the potential endogeneity of PROF, 
GROWTH, PPE, and SIZE in the GMM estimations by using two- to four-period lags 
of the same variables as instruments. The country variables (PRBOND, CONC, 
RIGHTS, CREDITORS, and ENFORCE) and country-industry, industry-year, and 
country-year dummy variables are considered exogenous. 
We use two-step estimation and specify the robust estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix of the parameters. We report results using one lag when the 
dependent variable is total debt and two lags when the dependent variable is short 
or long-term debt. The use of two lags for short and long-term debt is derived from 
statistical significance for short-term debt. The validity of the GMM estimator 
approach rests on two testable assumptions. First, for the instruments to be valid, 
they need to be uncorrelated with the error term. We use the Sargan Test of over-
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identifying restrictions to test this assumption (where statistically non-significant 
values confirm the validity of the instruments). Second, the GMM estimator requires 
the absence of second-order serial correlation in the first difference residual. We 
employ the m2 statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for a lack of 
second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residual. An insignificant m2 
statistic indicates that the model is correctly specified.  
3.3. Variables 
Appendix A describes how we define the variables used in the empirical analysis 
and their sources. Most of the variables are self-explanatory and have been used in 
other cross-country studies of firms’ debt structure. We therefore only describe in 
greater detail the proxies for our main variables: debt structure and banking 
liberalization. 
3.3.1. Debt structure 
We use three proxies to measure firms’ debt structure: 1) Total debt is measured 
by the ratio between long-term and short-term debt and the market value of 
assets, 2) Long-term debt is measured by the ratio between long-term debt and 
the market value of assets and, 3) Short-term debt is measured by the ratio 
between short-term debt and the market value of assets. Market value of assets is 
defined as total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity.3 The 
first variable measures the availability of debt whereas the other two variables are 
proxies for debt maturity. 
Table 1 shows for the total sample a mean leverage ratio of 26.30%, a mean long-
term debt ratio of 12.82%, and a mean short-term debt ratio of 11.17% with an 
                                                 
3 Welch (2004) argues that we should use market leverage ratios since our theories of target ratios are 
implicitly about market leverage ratios. Many other researchers analyze market value debt ratios, such 
as Fama and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
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average profitability of 9.28% and a mean value for growth opportunities of 2.97. 
The companies in the sample have on average a 32.17% ratio of property, plant, 
and equipment to total assets. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3.3.2. Banking liberalization 
We measure banking liberalization using the index of Financial Freedom published 
annually for each country by the Heritage Foundation. It is a composite index for 
the extent of government regulation of financial services; the extent of state 
intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of opening and 
operating financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals); and 
government influence on the allocation of credit. It varies on a scale of 0 to 100. 
Higher values indicate a less restrictive banking system. A detailed explanation of 
the specific banking and finance grading scale is given in Appendix B. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 shows that there are important differences in the value of BANKING 
FREEDOM among countries. The countries with the most open banking system are 
Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, and UK (their mean value is 90) while the 
country with the least banking freedom is India (its mean value is 30). The mean 
value of BFREEDOM is 65.21 (Table 1). Figure 1 shows the evolution of banking 
liberalization over the 1995-2004 period depending on countries’ development. It 
reveals that banking freedom has increased slightly in the countries in our sample, 
although evolution of the index is different between developed and developing 
countries. Developed countries have greater levels of financial freedom than 
developing countries (a mean value of 69.88 in developed versus 49.73 in 
developing countries), and the difference has increased over the 1995-2004 period. 
The difference between the mean-country values of the index of economic freedom 
has increased from 12.21 points (65.29 in developed vs 53.08 in developing 
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countries) in 1995 to 20.83 points (70.83 in developed vs. 50 in developing 
countries) in 2004. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4. Results 
4.1. Banking liberalization and firm leverage  
Table 3 shows the results of the partial-adjustment model [3] for the whole sample 
of firms using as dependent variables total, short-term, and long-term debt. The 
coefficients of country-industry, industry-year, and country-year dummies are not 
reported to save space. The m2 statistic allows us to reject the null hypothesis of 
the absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals. The 
statistically non-significant values for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
confirm the validity of the instruments in all estimations. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients of BFREEDOM and BFREEDOMt-1 
in column (1) indicate that the openness of the country’s banking system has a 
positive influence on total debt. This result holds in column (2) when we explicitly 
control for bank concentration, the protection of property and creditor rights, and 
law enforcement in a country. The results also show some degree of delay for the 
effect of banking liberalization since coefficients for some of the lagged values of 
BFREEDOM are statistically significant. 
Banking liberalization also affects firms’ debt maturity. Columns (3) and (4) report 
positive and statistically significant coefficients for BFREEDOM when the dependent 
variable is the short-term debt ratio, whereas the coefficients of BFREEDOM and its 
two lags are non-significant when we use the long-term debt ratio as the dependent 
variable in columns (5) and (6). The change in results depending on debt maturity 
indicates that, although banking liberalization increases the total amount of debt 
available to firms, it basically increases average short-term debt, and has no effect 
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on long-term debt. This result is consistent with our hypothesis 1, indicating that 
banking liberalization might reduce the benefits for banks of close lending 
relationships that allow reduction of the higher adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems associated with long-term debt. However, banking liberalization increases 
the availability of short-term debt, for which informational asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders are less relevant and close lending relationship are less 
beneficial. The net effect is an increase in debt availability for firms (a higher total 
debt ratio) and a reduction in debt maturity. 
In economic terms, using for instance the coefficients in column (2) of Table 2, a 
standard deviation increase in banking liberalization (19.37) would cause an 
increase in the total debt available which represents 14.09 per cent of its mean 
value. This effect represents an increase of 12.29 per cent in the mean value of 
short-term debt when we use the coefficients in column (4). 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with those found in previous 
studies. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of DEBTt-1 in all 
estimations suggest that firms have a target leverage to which they partially adjust 
in each period. Coefficients of DEBTt-1 for total debt take values of around 0.71, 
which implies  values of approximately 0.29. This value is similar to those 
reported by Huang and Ritter (2009), where the publicly traded US firms converge 
toward their long-run target at a rate of 23.2% per year. We also obtain statistically 
significant coefficients for the two lags of the short-term debt in columns (3)-(4) 
and for one lag of the long-term debt in columns (5) and (6). 
The coefficients of asset tangibility are positive and statistically significant in all 
estimations. They are consistent with the traditional arguments of the trade-off 
theory and the usefulness of a greater value of tangible assets as collateral to 
reduce agency cost between firms and debtholders. Size also has a positive and 
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significant impact on firms’ debt, which is consistent with size being an inverse 
proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. This result is similar to results shown in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), Gaud et al. (2005), and Antoniou et al. (2008). 
Coefficients of profitability and growth opportunities are not statistically significant 
at standard levels.  
The development of the corporate bond market in a country has negative 
coefficients in all estimations and is statistically significant in columns (2), (4), and 
(6). These negative coefficients suggest that changes in total debt are driven by 
changes in bank debt, but the development of the corporate bond market is a 
better proxy for financial market development and thus is positively associated with 
equity financing and negatively with bank or total debt. 
Bank concentration has a negative influence on short-term debt and a non-
significant influence on the long-term debt ratio. As a net result, bank concentration 
has a negative coefficient for total debt ratio.  
The proxies for the protection of property and creditor rights have, respectively, 
negative and positive coefficients. Although positive, only the coefficient of 
CREDITORSxENFORCE in column (4) is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The negative coefficients for RIGHTSxENFORCE are consistent with better 
protection of property rights lowering agency costs associated with equity issues 
and then promoting lower firm leverage. The positive coefficients for 
CREDITORSxENFORCE confirm that legal protection of creditor rights can reduce 
the agency cost of debt, as documented by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), 
Giannetti (2003), González and González (2008), and Antoniou et al. (2008). 
4.2. Banking liberalization, supervision, and firm leverage  
We now analyze whether the effects of banking liberalization on debt structure vary 
across countries depending on bank supervision. In estimations in Table 4 we 
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include, sequentially, interaction terms between banking freedom and our proxies 
for official and private supervision. Again, the m2 statistic and Sargan test allow us, 
respectively, to reject the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-
difference residuals and to confirm the validity of the instruments in all estimations. 
The negative and significant coefficients of BFREEDOMt-1 in columns (1), (4), and 
(7) reveal that banking liberalization reduces not only long-term debt but also 
short-term and total debt in countries with the lowest official supervisory powers. 
The interaction between banking freedom and official supervision has positive 
coefficients for all debt ratios (total, short-term, and long-term debt). In particular, 
we find positive and significant coefficients for BFREEDOMt-1 x OFFICIAL both when 
we only analyze the interaction between banking freedom and official supervision in 
columns (1), (4), and (7), and when we consider simultaneously the interaction 
between banking freedom and private monitoring in columns (3), (6), and (9). 
These results indicate that official supervision reduces the negative effect that 
banking liberalization has on debt availability and maturity in countries with the 
weakest official supervision. This result is consistent with our hypothesis 2, 
suggesting that the stronger the bank supervision the greater (lower) the positive 
(negative) effect of banking liberalization on debt availability.  
Private monitoring also improves the influence of banking liberalization on debt 
availability whatever the proxy we use for firm leverage in columns (2), (5), and 
(8). The negative and significant cumulative coefficient of ∑BFREEDOM and the 
positive and significant cumulative coefficient of ∑BFREEDOM x MONITOR in column 
(2) suggest that the positive effect of banking liberalization on debt availability 
requires a minimum of private supervision and that it increases with the intensity of 
private supervision. Similarly, we find that positive and significant coefficients of 
BFREEDOM x MONITOR and BFREEDOMt-2 x MONITOR in column (5) shape the 
influence of banking liberalization on short-term debt. Moreover, the negative and 
significant coefficient of BFREEDOMt-2 indicates that banking freedom reduces 
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access by firms to short-term debt in countries with the worst private monitoring. 
Private monitoring also shapes the influence of banking freedom on long-term debt 
ratios. The negative and significant coefficient of BFREEDOMt-1 in column (8) 
indicates that banking freedom reduces long-term debt in countries with the worst 
private monitoring. The positive coefficient of BFREEDOMt-1 x MONITOR suggests 
that this negative effect is reduced when private monitoring in a country improves. 
The influence of private monitoring to improve the effect of banking liberalization 
on debt availability is lower when we consider, simultaneously, private monitoring 
and official supervision in columns (6) and (9); it disappears altogether in column 
(3) when we analyze the effect on total debt. The significant coefficient of 
BFREEDOMt-1 x OFFICIAL and the non-significant coefficients of the interaction of 
BFREEDOM or its lags with MONITOR in column (3) suggest a more positive 
influence for official supervision than for private supervision on firms’ debt 
availability. The greater influence of official supervision in banking liberalization is 
consistent with official supervision being the main mechanism to enforce bank 
regulation. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
4.3. Banking liberalization, investor protection, and firm leverage  
We analyze in this section how the quality of investor protection shapes the 
influence of banking liberalization on firms’ debt structure. The results are shown in 
Table 5. In the estimations we include, sequentially, the interactions between bank 
liberalization and our proxies for the protection of property and creditor rights in a 
country.  
The cumulative coefficient of banking liberalization (∑BFREEDOM) is positive for our 
three dependent variables in columns (1), (3), and (5) when we include the 
interaction of banking liberalization and the enforced protection of property rights. 
We obtain a negative sign for the cumulative coefficient of the interaction term of 
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∑BFREEDOM x RIGHTS x ENFORCE when we consider the total debt ratio as the 
dependent variable (column (1)). This negative cumulative coefficient suggests that 
better enforced protection of property rights reduces the availability of firms’ debt. 
The cumulative coefficient of this interaction term is not statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (5), when the dependent variable is, respectively, the short-term 
and long-term debt. The significant coefficients of the Sargan test in columns (3) 
and (4) oblige us to be cautious when interpreting the results for short-term debt. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The cumulative coefficients for ∑BFREEDOM x CREDITORS x ENFORCE are negative 
and statistically significant for the three dependent variables in columns (2), (4), 
and (6). Moreover, the coefficients of CREDITORS x ENFORCE and the cumulative 
coefficients of ∑BFREEDOM keep their positive sign in these estimations. The 
positive coefficients of CREDITORS x ENFORCE and BFREEDOM suggest that both 
variables favor firms’ debt but, the higher the protection of creditors (banking 
liberalization), the lower the marginal benefit of increasing banking liberalization 
(protection of creditors). This indicates that the protection of creditor rights and 
banking liberalization are substitutes for promoting bank lending. The positive 
cumulative coefficient of BFREEDOM in column (6) indicates that banking 
liberalization even has a positive influence on long-term debt in countries with the 
lowest protection of creditor rights. One potential explanation is that weak 
protection of creditors does not favor lending relationships, so greater banking 
liberalization does not have any lending relationships to destroy and promotes 
better access not only to short-term debt but also to long-term debt. 
In economic terms, a standard deviation increase in the protection of creditor rights 
(1.26) would reduce the impact of a standard deviation increase in banking 
liberalization on total, short-term, and long-term debt by, respectively, 22.17%, 
20.94%, and 19.27% of the respective mean value of each type of debt. 
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4.4. Banking liberalization, development, firm size, and leverage 
We now analyze differences in the effects of banking liberalization between 
developed and developing countries and whether the influence of firm size varies 
between both groups of countries. The relevance of bank supervision and investor 
protection in a country for shaping the effect of banking liberalization may lead to 
differences between developed and developing countries. 
We include in the regressions three interaction terms: ∑BFREEDOM x DEV, 
∑BFREEDOM x SIZE, and ∑BFREEDOM x SIZE x DEV. When all the interaction terms 
are included, ∑BFREEDOM captures the influence of banking liberalization on 
smaller firms in developing countries, while ∑BFREEDOM x SIZE indicates the 
difference in the impact of banking liberalization when firm size increases in 
developing countries. ∑BFREEDOM x DEV captures the difference in the impact of 
banking liberalization on smaller firms between developed and developing 
countries, and ∑BFREEDOM x SIZE x DEV indicates the difference in the impact of 
banking liberalization between developed and developing countries when firm size 
increases. The results are reported in Table 6. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) report differences in the average influence of banking 
liberalization on firm’s access to debt between developed and developing countries. 
The cumulative positive coefficients of ∑BFREEDOM in columns (1) and (3) indicate 
that banking liberalization increases the availability of short-term and total debt in 
developing countries, but we do not find a significant effect of banking freedom on 
long-term debt in developing countries in column (5). We only find a statistically 
significant cumulative coefficient for the interaction between ∑BFREEDOM and DEV 
in column (3) when the short-term debt ratio is the dependent variable. This result 
suggests that the positive influence of banking liberalization on short-term debt is 
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higher in developed countries. So, banking liberalization increases the availability of 
short-term debt and reduces debt maturity more in developed countries. 
We analyze potential differences in the influence of firm size between developed 
and developing countries in columns (2), (4), and (6). The cumulative negative 
coefficients of ∑BFREEDOM x SIZE suggest that the positive effect of banking 
liberalization on short-term, long-term, and then total debt ratios decreases with 
firm size in developing countries. Moreover, the cumulative coefficient for the 
interaction term ∑BFREEDOM x SIZE for long-term debt is higher than for short-
term debt. It indicates that banking liberalization not only reduces debt availability 
for large firms in developing countries but also has a negative effect on debt 
maturity for these firms. 
These results are consistent with the adverse effects of financing constraints on 
large firms that Laeven (2003) finds for financial liberalization in firms from 13 
emerging countries. He argues that large firms may have had better access to 
preferential direct credit before the financial liberalization. 
The cumulative positive coefficients of ∑BFREEDOM x DEV and ∑BFREEDOM x SIZE 
x DEV in column (2) indicate that larger firms in developed countries are the most 
positively affected in access to debt when banking liberalization increases. This 
result is consistent with our hypothesis 4 and those found by Petersen and Rajan 
(1994, 1995) and Zarutskie (2006) in US firms. The model in Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) suggests that greater competition among creditors discourages them from 
lending to firms whose credit qualities are not well known, and from subsidizing 
such higher-risk loans by charging higher interest rates as they age. Our result 
suggests that relationship banking basically involves smaller firms only in 
developed countries, whereas in less developed countries it is the larger firms that 
suffer the greatest reduction in debt availability when banking liberalization 
increases.  
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The m2 statistic and Sargan test allow us, respectively, to again reject the lack of 
second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals and to confirm the 
validity of the instruments in all estimations.  
5. Conclusions  
We analyze the effect of banking liberalization on firms’ debt structure using a 
panel database of a maximum of 9,822 firms in 37 countries over the 1995-2004 
period. Our results show that, on average, banking liberalization increases firms’ 
debt availability and reduces its maturity. We observe an increase in the total debt 
ratio based on an increase in the short-term debt ratio but on a non-increase in the 
long-term debt ratio. The different effect on short and long-term debt is consistent 
with the relevance of informational asymmetries for explaining the effect of banking 
liberalization. When the greater informational asymmetries of long-term debt 
increase the relevance of relationship banking for solving adverse selection and 
moral hazard, they reduce the benefits of banking liberalization. Short-term debt, 
however, is less dependent on bank relationship, and greater competition 
associated with banking liberalization increases its availability. These results are 
consistent with the model of Petersen and Rajan (1995) in which greater banking 
market competition reduces long-term lending to firms whose credit qualities are 
not well known because it prevents banks from subsidizing current higher-risk loans 
by charging higher interest rates in the future and from getting to know the real 
quality of firms. 
We also find that the effects of banking liberalization vary across firms and 
countries. The increase in debt availability is higher in countries with stronger 
official and private supervision, and lower protection of creditor and property rights. 
The reduction of debt maturity is higher in countries with better protection of 
property rights and in developed countries. We also find that the effect of banking 
liberalization varies with firm size depending on countries’ development. Larger 
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firms in developing and smaller firms in developed countries benefit the least from 
banking liberalization. 
The results have important policy implications for banking liberalization processes. 
The empirical results suggest caution when a banking liberalization process is 
adopted because, although it will increase the total debt available for firms, it will 
also reduce debt maturity. Although the effects are not equal across countries, we 
can propose some policy recommendations for banking liberalization. In particular, 
successful banking liberalization requires strong official or private supervision to 
provide positive effects for firms’ debt availability. This implies that liberalization 
policies must go together with reinforcement of the power of authorities in 
countries where official supervision is less developed. Moreover, banking 
liberalization reduces firms’ access to long-term debt, especially for larger firms in 
developing countries. Unlike the mixed effects of banking liberalization, better 
protection of creditor rights increases access to both short-term and long-term 
debt, so increasing such protection would be an effective way of improving the 
credit channel. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of banking liberalization 
The figure shows the evolution of Financial Freedom during the period 1995-2004. Financial Freedom is 
one of the 10 aspects measured in the Index of Economic Freedom established by the Heritage 
Foundation. It is scored by determining the extent of government regulation of financial services; the 
extent of state intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of opening and operating 
financial services firms; and government influence on the allocation of credit. It is scored on a scale of 0 
to 100, where higher values indicate lower restrictions on banking. DEVELOPED countries are countries 
classified as high income and upper middle income and DEVELOPING countries are countries classified as 
low income and lower middle income according to GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank’s 
Atlas method.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (I) 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of firm-level and country-level variables. TOTAL DEBT is the ratio between the 
book value of debt (long-term and short-term debt) and the market value of total assets; LONG-TERM DEBT is the ratio 
between the book value of long-term debt and the market value of total assets; SHORT-TERM DEBT is the ratio 
between the book value of short-term debt and the market value of total assets; PROFIT is estimated as EBIT plus 
depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is growth 
opportunities and is measured by Tobin’s Q; PPE is the ratio between tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) 
and total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of firms’ sales; BFREEDOM measures the openness of the banking and 
financial system. PRBOND is the percentage of the private domestic debt over GDP; CONC is the fraction of assets held 
by the three largest commercial banks in each country; RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights; 
CREDITORS measures creditor rights; ENFORCE measures the country’s legal enforcement; OFFICIAL measures the 
extent to which official supervisors have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems; 
MONITOR measures the degree of private oversight.  
 MEAN MEDIAN STANDARD DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
TOTAL DEBT (%) 26.3 20.8 23.52 0 83.86 
LONG-TERM DEBT (%) 12.82 7.91 14.14 0 56.85 
SHORT-TERM DEBT (%) 11.17 4.93 13.93 0 59.11 
PROFIT (%) 9.28 10.94 32.87 -33.26 44.1 
GROWTH 2.97 1.5 30.17 0 7426.01 
PPE(%) 32.17 28.91 33.43 0 72.46 
SIZE 5.15 5.17 2.1 -11.62 12.44 
BFREEDOM 65.21 70 19.37 30 90 
PRBOND 46.33 43.7 34.36 0 130.22 
CONC (%) 50.04 45.67 18.76 26.04 99.87 
RIGHTS 1.46 1 0.75 1 4 
CREDITORS 2.12 2 1.26 0 4 
ENFORCE 8.62 9.37 1.5 2.9 9.99 
OFFICIAL 11.26 12 2.72 3 15 
MONITOR 7.68 8 1.25 5 12 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (II) 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of country-level variables across countries. Descriptive statistics are split 
between developed and developing countries according to GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank’s Atlas 
method. BFREEDOM measures the openness of the banking and financial system. PRBOND is the percentage of private 
domestic debt over GDP; CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each country; 
RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights; CREDITORS measures creditor rights; ENFORCE measures the 
country’s legal enforcement; OFFICIAL measures the extent to which official supervisors have the authority to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems; MONITOR measures the degree of private oversight.  
 BFREEDOM PRBOND CONC (%) RIGHTS CREDITORS ENFORCE OFFICIAL MONITOR 
Developed         
Argentina 56.90 6.93 41.16 3.16 1.00 5.79 12 8 
Australia 90.00 29.56 63.78 5.00 3.00 9.30 12 10 
Austria 75.84 34.33 67.73 5.00 3.00 9.47 14 6 
Belgium 70.00 43.95 87.94 5.00 2.00 9.49 10 8 
Canada 70.00 19.54 54.61 5.00 1.00 9.58 9 9 
Denmark 77.18 109.26 78.29 5.00 3.00 9.80 9 7 
Finland 57.91 23.64 98.37 5.00 1.00 9.80 9 9 
France 50.00 42.89 56.00 4.00 0.00 8.97 8 6 
Germany 53.90 52.76 64.60 5.00 3.00 9.37 11 5 
Greece 40.66 0.62 70.10 3.60 1.00 6.82 10 6 
Hong Kong 89.17 17.32 68.77 5.00 4.00 8.77 10 8 
Ireland 79.09 9.50 63.29 5.00 1.00 8.40 11 6 
Italy 67.91 37.27 38.28 4.00 2.00 7.95 6 6 
Japan 48.26 46.23 37.55 4.63 1.76 9.37 13 8 
Netherlands 90.00 48.17 70.11 5.00 3.00 9.87 8 6 
New Zealand 90.00 0.00 75.02 5.00 4.00 9.80 7 8 
Norway 50.00 21.63 89.98 5.00 2.00 9.76 8 10 
Portugal 50.00 22.58 85.46 4.00 1.00 7.81 13 8 
Singapore 70.00 18.95 91.99 5.00 3.00 8.99 3 9 
Spain 66.54 17.54 57.88 4.00 2.00 7.87 10 8 
Sweden 75.88 43.77 97.54 4.52 1.05 9.92 6 6 
Switzerland 88.40 41.98 78.41 4.92 1.00 9.99 13 8 
UK 90.00 17.31 48.51 5.00 4.00 9.40 12 8 
US 79.41 1.01 29.46 5.00 1.00 9.52 14 8 
Mean 69.88 29.45 67.28 4.66 1.96 8.99 9.92 7.54 
Median 70.00 23.11 68.25 5.00 2.00 9.39 10.00 8.00 
Standard dev 15.78 23.39 19.44 0.55 1.12 1.06 2.78 1.38 
Minimum 40.66 0.00 29.46 3.16 0.00 5.79 3.00 5.00 
Maximum 90.00 109.26 98.37 5.00 4.00 9.99 14.00 10.00 
Developing         
Brazil 50.00 10.58 42.83 3.00 1.00 6.52 15 8 
Chile 57.64 19.97 55.52 5.00 2.00 5.66 11 8 
India 30.00 0.59 36.32 3.00 2.00 6.12 9 6 
Indonesia 35.56 1.67 59.57 2.46 2.23 2.90 14 8 
Malaysia 38.35 49.62 44.75 3.42 3.00 7.71 11 9 
Mexico 46.43 2.34 66.98 3.06 0.00 5.99 10 6 
Pakistan 51.14 0.00 59.58 2.64 1.00 3.67 6 12 
Peru 70.00 3.45 72.12 2.67 0.00 4.83 14 8 
Philippines 50.00 0.08 49.92 3.35 1.00 4.08 12 8 
South Africa 55.53 9.99 73.91 3.00 3.00 6.44 4 8 
South Korea 53.70 46.11 45.30 4.69 3.00 6.71 10 6 
Thailand 50.00 13.21 52.59 4.07 2.29 5.93 11 6 
Turkey 58.19 0.03 62.04 3.54 2.00 5.46 11 6 
Mean 49.73 12.13 55.49 3.38 1.73 5.54 10.62 7.62 
Median 50.00 3.45 55.52 3.06 2.00 5.93 11.00 8.00 
Standard dev 10.52 17.03 11.58 0.78 1.05 1.34 3.07 1.71 
Minimum 30.00 0.00 36.32 2.46 0.00 2.90 4.00 6.00 
Maximum 70.00 49.62 73.91 5.00 3.00 7.71 15.00 12.00 
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Table 3. Banking liberalization and firm leverage 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for 
panel data with lagged dependent variables. Three dependent variables are used: total, short-term, and 
long-term debt. The dependent variables are measured as the ratio between the book value of debt and 
the market value of total assets. As explanatory variables, we include one lag or two lags of the 
dependent variable (DEBTt-1 and DEBTt-2); PROFIT is estimated as EBIT plus depreciation expenses and 
provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is growth opportunities 
and is measured by Tobin’s Q. PPE is the ratio between tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) 
and total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales; PRBOND is the percentage of private domestic 
debt over GDP; CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each 
country; RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights; CREDITORS measures the protection of 
creditor rights; ENFORCE measures the country’s legal enforcement; BFREEDOM measures the openness 
of the banking and financial system. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Total debt Short-term debt Long-term debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.0090 (-1.40) 
-0.0113* 
(-1.65) 
-0.0048 
(-1.39) 
-0.0057* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0060 
(-1.28) 
-0.0055 
(-1.11) 
DEBTt-1 
0.7050*** 
(7.41) 
0.7123*** 
(6.48) 
0.5192*** 
(13.14) 
0.5301*** 
(14.87) 
0.6290*** 
(8.00) 
0.6322*** 
(7.73) 
DEBTt-2 
  0.0700*** 
(5.55) 
0.0734*** 
(5.86) 
0.0014 
(0.006) 
0.0053 
(0.23) 
PROFIT 0.1928 (0.88) 
0.2556 
(1.00) 
-0.0400 
(-0.39) 
0.0016 
(0.02) 
-0.0723 
(-0.47) 
-0.0426 
(-0.26) 
GROWTH -0.0112 (-1.39) 
-0.0100 
(-1.17) 
-0.0042 
(-0.65) 
-0.0034 
(-0.71) 
-0.0008 
(-0.29) 
-0.0010 
(-0.39) 
PPE 0.5624** (2.52) 
0.6019** 
(2.36) 
0.1904** 
(1.97) 
0.2447** 
(2.46) 
0.3490** 
(2.49) 
0.3707** 
(2.41) 
SIZE 0.2057** (2.43) 
0.1981** 
(2.29) 
0.0775** 
(2.37) 
0.0919*** 
(2.87) 
0.0614 
(0.96) 
0.0556 
(0.88) 
PRBOND -0.0816 (-1.43) 
-0.2095*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.0290 
(-0.96) 
-0.0772*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.0517 
(-1.61) 
-0.0842** 
(-2.17) 
CONC 
 -0.2762*** 
(-2.65) 
 -0.1318** 
(-2.36) 
 -0.0354 
(-0.62) 
RIGHTS x ENFORCE 
 -0.0036*** 
(-2.96) 
 -0.0021*** 
(-4.67) 
 -0.0012* 
(-1.92) 
CREDITORS x ENFORCE 
 0.0026** 
(2.32) 
 0.0007 
(1.59) 
 0.0016* 
(1.85) 
BFREEDOM  
0.0005** 
(2.45) 
0.0008*** 
(3.57) 
0.0006*** 
(4.21) 
0.0007*** 
(6.41) 
-0.0000 
(-0.26) 
0.0000 
(0.21) 
BFREEDOMt-1 
0.0011** 
(2.29) 
0.0011** 
(2.26) 
0.0001 
(0.72) 
0.0003 
(1.29) 
0.0005 
(1.35) 
0.0005 
(1.26) 
BFREEDOM t-2 
0.0006 
(0.80) 
0.0004 
(0.59) 
0.0005 
(1.23) 
0.0006 
(1.49) 
-0.0002 
(-0.36) 
-0.0003 
(-0.55) 
Country-Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m2 -0.97 -0.76 -0.49 -0.26 0.56 0.39 
# observations 41,262 41,145 40,830 40,710 40,377 40,265 
# firms 9,822 9,820 9,656 9,655 9,705 9,703 
Sargan test 1.00 2.21 1.86 1.75 1.06 1.02 
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Table 4. Banking liberalization, supervision, and firm leverage 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for 
panel data with lagged dependent variables. Three dependent variable are used: total, short-term, and 
long-term debt. The dependent variables are measured as the ratio between the book value of debt and 
the market value of total assets. As explanatory variables, we include one lag or two lags of the 
dependent variable (DEBTt-1 and DEBTt-2); PROFIT is estimated as EBIT plus depreciation expenses and 
provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is growth opportunities 
and is measured by Tobin’s Q. PPE is the ratio between tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) 
and total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales; PRBOND is the percentage of private domestic 
debt over GDP; CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each 
country; RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights; CREDITORS measures the protection of 
creditor rights; ENFORCE measures the country’s legal enforcement; BFREEDOM measures the openness 
of the banking and financial system; OFFICIAL measures the extent to which official supervisors have 
the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems; MONITOR measures the degree of 
private oversight. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Total debt Short-term debt Long-term debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -0.0070 (-0.70) 
-0.0070 
(-0.87) 
-0.0043 
(-0.44) 
-0.0018 
(-0.43) 
-0.0029 
(-0.81) 
-0.0006 
(-0.15) 
-0.0053 
(-0.71) 
-0.0053 
(-0.87) 
-0.0049 
(-0.64) 
DEBTt-1 0.7176*** (6.57) 
0.7082*** 
(6.50) 
0.7138*** 
(6.53) 
0.5221*** 
(14.96) 
0.5217*** 
(14.22) 
0.5177*** 
(14.80) 
0.6268*** 
(7.38) 
0.6298*** 
(7.73) 
0.6257*** 
(7.31) 
DEBTt-2    0.0701*** (5.57) 
0.0707*** 
(5.63) 
0.0685*** 
(5.43) 
0.0066 
(0.30) 
0.0064 
(0.28) 
0.0072 
(0.32) 
PROFIT 0.2319 
(0.85) 
0.2480 
(0.94) 
0.2304 
(0.84) 
0.0087 
(0.12) 
0.0044 
(0.06) 
0.0098 
(0.14) 
-0.0296 
(-0.17) 
-0.0429 
(-0.26) 
-0.0302 
(-0.17) 
GROWTH -0.0084 
(-0.97) 
-0.0095 
(-1.09) 
-0.0082 
(-0.95) 
-0.0029 
(-0.71) 
-0.0033 
(-0.72) 
-0.0029 
(-0.71) 
-0.0008 
(-0.34) 
-0.0009 
(-0.36) 
-0.0008 
(-0.31) 
PPE 0.5973** 
(2.24) 
0.5871** 
(2.29) 
0.5867** 
(2.17) 
0.2544*** 
(2.58) 
0.2321** 
(2.45) 
0.2485*** 
(2.51) 
0.3688** 
(2.19) 
0.3677** 
(2.37) 
0.3671** 
(2.16) 
SIZE 0.1951** 
(2.08) 
0.2020** 
(2.22) 
0.1984** 
(2.08) 
0.0983*** 
(3.02) 
0.0956*** 
(3.02) 
0.1002*** 
(3.11) 
0.0569 
(0.82) 
0.0559 
(0.84) 
0.0577 
(0.82) 
PRBOND -0.2281*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.2304*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.2433*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.0844*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.0901*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.0896*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.0872* 
(-1.85) 
-0.0853** 
(-1.99) 
-0.0901* 
(-1.89) 
CONC -0.2482** 
(-2.37) 
-0.2696** 
(-2.37) 
-0.2509** 
(-2.26) 
-0.1286** 
(-2.50) 
-0.1358** 
(-2.37) 
-0.1310** 
(-2.53) 
-0.0309 
(-0.55) 
-0.0286 
(-0.48) 
-0.293 
(-0.52) 
RIGHTS x ENFORCE -0.0037*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.0039*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.0039*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.0022*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.0023*** 
(-4.99) 
-0.0022*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.0013* 
(-1.90) 
-0.0013* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0013* 
(-1.91) 
CREDITORS x ENFORCE 0.0026** 
(2.13) 
0.0027** 
(2.30) 
0.0027** 
(2.17) 
0.0008* 
(1.79) 
0.0007* 
(1.78) 
0.0008* 
(1.90) 
0.0016* 
(1.65) 
0.0016* 
(1.76) 
0.0016* 
(1.64) 
BFREEDOM  -0.0003 (-0.19) 
-0.0013 
(-1.03) 
-0.0019 
(-0.99) 
0.0002 
(0.35) 
-0.0007 
(-0.89) 
-0.0009 
(-1.06) 
0.0006 
(0.59) 
0.0005 
(0.62) 
0.0009 
(0.64) 
BFREEDOMt-1 -0.0047*** (-3.66) 
-0.0028** 
(-2.11) 
-0.0059*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.0015*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.0005 
(-0.64) 
-0.0015* 
(-1.74) 
-0.0027*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.0022*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0039*** 
(-3.12) 
BFREEDOM t-2 0.0015 (0.57) 
-0.0014 
(-0.97) 
-0.0003 
(-0.13) 
-0.0018 
(-1.41) 
-0.0017** 
(-2.21) 
-0.0026** 
(-2.05) 
0.0021 
(1.41) 
0.0009 
(0.95) 
0.0022 
(1.37) 
BFREEDOM x OFFICIAL 0.0001 
(0.78)  
0.0001 
(0.64) 
0.0000 
(1.04)  
0.0000 
(0.73) 
-0.0000 
(-0.47)  
-0.0000 
(-0.43) 
BFREEDOMt-1 x OFFICIAL 0.0005*** (3.35)  
0.0005*** 
(3.17) 
0.0002*** 
(2.72)  
0.0002*** 
(2.73) 
0.0003** 
(2.30)  
0.0003** 
(2.11) 
BFREEDOMt-2 x OFFICIAL -0.0001 (-0.38)  
-0.0002 
(-0.56) 
0.0002 
(1.49)  
0.0002 
(1.25) 
-0.0002 
(-1.32)  
-0.0002 
(-1.25) 
BFREEDOM x MONITOR  0.0003* (1.64) 
0.0002 
(1.52)  
0.0002* 
(1.86) 
0.0002* 
(1.68)  
-0.0001 
(-0.54) 
-0.0000 
(-0.43) 
BFREEDOMt-1 x MONITOR  0.0005*** (2.74) 
0.0002 
(1.08)  
0.0001 
(1.01) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13)  
0.0004*** 
(2.80) 
0.0002** 
(1.90) 
BFREEDOMt-2 x MONITOR  0.0002 (0.91) 
0.0003 
(1.22)  
0.0003** 
(2.28) 
0.0002 
(1.58)  
-0.0002 
(-0.93) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
Country-Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m2 -0.56 -0.68 -0.54 -0.05 -0.24 -0.07 0.31 0.38 0.33 
# observations 41,145 41,145 41,145 40,710 40,710 40,710 40,265 40,265 40,265 
# firms 9,820 9,820 9,820 9,655 9,655 9,655 9,703 9,703 9,703 
Sargan test 3.08 2.14 2.94 1.69 1.66 1.62 1.28 1.15 1.33 
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Table 5. Banking liberalization, investor protection, and firm 
leverage 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for 
panel data with lagged dependent variables. Three dependent variable are used: total, short-term, and 
long-term debt. The dependent variables are measured as the ratio between the book value of debt and 
the market value of total assets. As explanatory variables, we include one lag or two lags of the 
dependent variable (DEBTt-1 and DEBTt-2); PROFIT is estimated as EBIT plus depreciation expenses and 
provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is growth opportunities 
and is measured by Tobin’s Q. PPE is the ratio between tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) 
and total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales; PRBOND is the percentage of private domestic 
debt over GDP; CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each 
country; RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights; CREDITORS measures the protection of 
creditor rights; ENFORCE measures the country’s legal enforcement; BFREEDOM measures the openness 
of the banking and financial system.  T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Total debt Short-term debt Long-term debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.0155* (-1.92) 
-0.0138** 
(-1.99) 
-0.0082*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.0080** 
(2.55) 
-0.0062 
(-0.64) 
-0.0041 
(-0.44) 
DEBTt-1 0.8769*** (8.98) 
0.8974*** 
(10.67) 
0.7016*** 
(4.60) 
0.6623*** 
(4.16) 
0.9952*** 
(4.62) 
0.9781*** 
(3.47) 
DEBTt-2   0.0168 (0.22) 
0.0300 
(0.39) 
-0.0701 
(-0.28) 
-0.0366 
(-0.12) 
PROFIT -0.1273 
(-0.66) 
-0.1015 
(-0.59) 
0.0267 
(0.26) 
0.0227 
(0.21) 
0.2766* 
(1.82) 
0.3008* 
(1.77) 
GROWTH 0.0108 
(1.49) 
0.0133** 
(2.01) 
-0.0017 
(-0.43) 
-0.0023 
(-0.52) 
0.0067 
(1.12) 
0.0079 
(1.20) 
PPE 0.2661 
(1.61) 
0.3312* 
(1.92) 
0.1298** 
(2.45) 
0.1368*** 
(2.54) 
0.3330 
(1.48) 
0.3925* 
(1.68) 
SIZE 0.0584 
(0.72) 
0.0691 
(0.87) 
0.0609*** 
(3.18) 
0.0596*** 
(2.73) 
0.0563 
(0.68) 
0.0710 
(0.74) 
PRBOND -0.1861*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.2271*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0818** 
(-2.30) 
-0.0912*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.1248*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.1314*** 
(-3.13) 
CONC 0.0109 
(0.20) 
0.0714 
(1.19) 
-0.0935** 
(-2.17) 
-0.0863* 
(-1.82) 
0.0530 
(1.34) 
0.0788** 
(1.98) 
RIGHTS x ENFORCE -0.0009 
(-0.22) 
-0.0047*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.0023* 
(-1.80) 
-0.0018*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.0012 
(-0.35) 
-0.0026 
(-1.54) 
CREDITORS x ENFORCE 0.0013 
(1.17) 
0.0145** 
(2.45) 
0.0002 
(0.78) 
0.0055*** 
(3.54) 
0.0019* 
(1.68) 
0.0116 
(1.25) 
BFREEDOM 0.0047*** 
(6.74) 
0.0019*** 
(4.23) 
0.0022*** 
(4.33) 
0.0013*** 
(4.79) 
0.0013* 
(1.85) 
0.0012** 
(2.30) 
BFREEDOMt-1 -0.0041*** (-3.16) 
0.0028** 
(2.36) 
-0.0018*** 
(-2.96) 
0.0009** 
(2.19) 
-0.0022** 
(-2.12) 
0.0022* 
(1.79) 
BFREEDOMt-2 0.0023*** (3.69) 
-0.0019** 
(-2.08) 
0.0004 
(0.79) 
0.0002 
(0.29) 
0.0018*** 
(2.70) 
-0.0014 
(-0.61) 
BFREEDOMt x RIGHTS x ENFORCE -0.0001*** (-5.49) 
 -0.00004*** 
(-3.11) 
 -0.0000 
(-1.44) 
 
BFREEDOMt-1 x RIGHTS x ENFORCE 0.0001*** (2.62) 
 0.00005*** 
(2.99) 
 0.0001** 
(2.10) 
 
BFREEDOMt-2 x RIGHTS x ENFORCE -0.0001*** (-5.41) 
 -0.0000 
(-0.21) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-4.23) 
 
BFREEDOM x CREDITORS x ENFORCE  -0.0001*** (-3.63) 
 -0.0001** 
(-2.46) 
 -0.0001 
(-1.52) 
BFREEDOMt-1 x CREDITORS x ENFORCE  -0.0002*** (-3.03) 
 -0.0001** 
(-2.53) 
 -0.0001* 
(-1.78) 
BFREEDOMt-2 x CREDITORS x ENFORCE  0.0000 (0.29) 
 0.0000 
(0.26) 
 0.0000 
(0.01) 
Country-Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m2 1.09 1.08 0.79 0.59 0.75 0.53 
# observations 41,145 41,145 40,710 40,710 40,265 40,265 
# firms 9,820 9,820 9,655 9,655 9,703 9,703 
Sargan test 3.25 2.89 14.25** 12.02** 6.33 5.87 
 
 38 
Table 6. Banking liberalization, economic development and firm leverage 
Regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for panel data 
with lagged dependent variables. Three dependent variable are used: total, short-term, and long-term debt. The 
dependent variables are measured as the ratio between the book value of debt and the market value of total 
assets. As explanatory variables, we include one lag or two lags of the dependent variable (DEBTt-1 and DEBTt-2); 
PROFIT is estimated as EBIT plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) 
divided by total assets; GROWTH is growth opportunities and is measured by Tobin’s Q. PPE is the ratio between 
tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) and total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales; PRBOND is 
the percentage of private domestic debt over GDP; CONC is the fraction of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in each country; RIGHTS measures the protection of property rights; CREDITORS measures the 
protection of creditor rights; ENFORCE measures the country’s legal enforcement; BFREEDOM measures the 
openness of the banking and financial system; DEV is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for developed 
countries and 0 for developing economies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Total debt Short-term debt Long-term debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.0173*** (-4.33) 
-0.0183*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.0109** 
(-2.37) 
-0.0105*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.0060** 
(-2.17) 
-0.0066*** 
(-2.78) 
DEBTt-1 0.8269*** (11.66) 
0.7384*** 
(7.60) 
0.5695*** 
(15.67) 
0.5823*** 
(19.01) 
0.6753*** 
(10.34) 
0.6835*** 
(14.75) 
DEBTt-2 
  0.0864*** 
(6.28) 
0.0891*** 
(6.52) 
0.0024 
(0.15) 
0.0091 
(0.65) 
PROFIT -0.0615 
(-0.42) 
-0.0826 
(-0.37) 
-0.0584 
(-0.35) 
-0.1030 
(-0.79) 
-0.0903 
(-1.02) 
-0.1152** 
(-2.00) 
GROWTH -0.0074 
(-1.51) 
-0.0091 
(-1.18) 
-0.0056 
(-0.65) 
-0.0040 
(-0.59) 
-0.0012 
(-0.69) 
-0.0018 
(-1.53) 
PPE 0.3405*** 
(3.36) 
0.1669 
(1.38) 
0.0894 
(1.39) 
0.0415 
(0.74) 
0.3131*** 
(4.45) 
0.2336*** 
(3.79) 
SIZE 0.1997*** 
(4.38) 
1.1059*** 
(4.21) 
0.0705*** 
(2.64) 
0.3254** 
(2.34) 
0.0825** 
(2.36) 
0.5921*** 
(3.12) 
PRBOND -0.0767* 
(-1.65) 
-0.1047** 
(-2.61) 
-0.0241 
(-0.95) 
-0.0318 
(-1.28) 
-0.0294 
(-1.05) 
-0.0503** 
(-2.07) 
CONC -0.2094*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.1808** 
(-2.31) 
-0.1231 
(-1.51) 
-0.0974 
(-1.61) 
-0.0265 
(-0.77) 
-0.0199 
(-0.69) 
RIGHTS x ENFORCE -0.0026*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.0028*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0013*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.0015*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.0009** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0012*** 
(-3.04) 
CREDITORS x ENFORCE 0.0003 
(1.11) 
0.0008*** 
(2.66) 
-0.0005* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0003 
(-1.35) 
0.0009*** 
(4.51) 
0.0012*** 
(5.14) 
BFREEDOM 0.0015*** 
(3.00) 
0.0044*** 
(3.69) 
0.0007** 
(2.05) 
0.0016** 
(2.42) 
-0.0001 
(-0.34) 
0.0016** 
(2.14) 
BFREEDOMt-1 -0.0023*** (-5.86) 
0.0014 
(1.44) 
-0.0011*** 
(-3.62) 
0.0003 
(0.40) 
-0.0008*** 
(-2.79) 
0.0009 
(1.37) 
BFREEDOMt-2 0.0021*** (6.14) 
0.0043*** 
(7.10) 
0.0009*** 
(3.38) 
0.0014*** 
(3.50) 
0.0008*** 
(3.07) 
0.0023*** 
(4.26) 
BFREEDOM x DEV -0.0013** 
(-2.23) 
-0.0004 
(-0.56) 
-0.0001 
(-0.36) 
0.0002 
(0.40) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0002 
(0.45) 
BFREEDOMt-1 x DEV 0.0034*** (7.55) 
0.0022*** 
(3.00) 
0.0012*** 
(3.21) 
0.0007 
(1.47) 
0.0014*** 
(4.29) 
0.0011** 
(2.52) 
BFREEDOMt-2 x DEV -0.0020** (-2.23) 
-0.0017 
(-1.43) 
-0.0006 
(-1.16) 
-0.0007* 
(-1.71) 
-0.0011* 
(-1.95) 
-0.0010** 
(-2.12) 
BFREEDOM x SIZE  -0.0068*** (-3.37) 
 -0.0020* 
(-1.90) 
 -0.0036*** 
(-2.62) 
BFREEDOMt-1x SIZE  -0.0074*** (-4.48) 
 -0.0028*** 
(-2.67) 
 -0.0033*** 
(-2.63) 
BFREEDOMt-2 x SIZE  -0.0075*** (-3.64) 
 -0.0014 
(-1.23) 
 -0.0045*** 
(-3.31) 
BFREEDOM x SIZE x DEV  0.0021 (1.60) 
 0.0004 
(0.61) 
 0.0012* 
(1.70) 
BFREEDOMt-1 x SIZE x DEV  0.0027*** (2.76) 
 0.0012* 
(1.94) 
 0.0007 
(1.04) 
BFREEDOMt-2 x SIZE x DEV  0.0024** (2.23) 
 0.0004 
(0.53) 
 0.0018** 
(2.32) 
Country-Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
m2 -0.38 -0.53 -0.85 -0.82 0.90 0.89 
# observations 41,145 41,145 40,710 40,710 40,265 40,265 
# firms 9,820 9,820 9,655 9,655 9,703 9,703 
Sargan test 0.38 0.86 2.29 3.14 0.97 0.99 
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Appendix A. Variables 
The table shows the definition of variables used in the paper and their sources 
Name Definition Source 
DEBT STRUCTURE 
Total debt The ratio between total debt and market value of assets. The market value of assets 
is estimated adding the market value of equity and the book value of debt. 
Worldscope 
Short-term 
debt 
The ratio between short-term debt and market value of assets. The market value of 
assets is estimated adding the market value of equity and the book value of debt. 
Worldscope 
Long-term 
debt 
The ratio between long-term debt and market value of assets. The market value of 
assets is estimated adding the market value of equity and the book value of debt. 
Worldscope 
BANKING LIBERALIZATION 
BFREEDOM Composite index of the extent of government regulation of financial services; the 
extent of state intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of 
opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign 
individuals); and government influence on the allocation of credit. 
Heritage Foundation 
OTHER COUNTRY VARIABLES 
PRBOND Private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and corporations as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Financial Development 
and Structure Dataset 
(World Bank). Beck et 
al. (2009) 
CONC The fraction of bank assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country. World Bank Database 
RIGHTS Indicator of the degree to which private property rights are protected and the degree 
to which government enforces laws that protect private property. It also accounts for 
the possibility that private property may be expropriated, and analyzes the 
independence of the judiciary, corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of 
individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges between 1 and 5. We 
reverse the scale of the original index, so that a high score indicates greater legal 
protection of property. 
Heritage Foundation 
CREDITORS This index measures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy: (1) whether there 
are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; (2) 
whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition for 
reorganization is approved, that is, whether there is no automatic stay or asset freeze 
imposed by the court; (3) whether secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds 
of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) whether an administrator, and not 
management, is responsible for running the business during the reorganization. A 
value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws and regulations provide each 
of these powers to secured lenders, consequently it varies between 0 (poor creditor 
rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
ENFORCE Annual index of law and order of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This 
ranges from 0 to 6 with a higher figure indicating a better quality and enforcement of 
the legal system. 
ICRG published by the 
Political Risk Service 
Group 
OFFICIAL Official supervisory power, ranging from 0 to 16, captures the power of supervisors to 
take prompt corrective action, to restructure and reorganize troubled banks, and to 
declare a troubled bank insolvent. Higher values indicate greater power of 
supervisors. 
Barth et al. (2001) 
MONITOR Private oversight, ranging from 0 to 12, measures the intensity of audit and 
information disclosure requirements, and whether subordinated debt is allowable as a 
part of regulatory capital. Higher values indicate greater private oversight. 
Barth et al. (2001) 
DEV Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for developed countries and 0 for developing 
economies. Developed countries are countries classified as high income and upper 
middle income and developing countries are countries classified as low income and 
lower middle income according to GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank’s 
Atlas method.  
Financial Structure 
Dataset (World Bank) 
CONTROL VARIABLES AT FIRM LEVEL 
PROFIT Earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-
cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets 
Worldscope 
GROWTH The market-to-book ratio Worldscope 
PPE The percentage of property, plant and equipment in total assets Worldscope 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total sales Worldscope 
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Appendix B. Index of Banking Freedom 
The table describes the ten categories of the Banking and Finance Index established by the Heritage 
Foundation. The scale runs from 0 to 100: A higher score signifies a less restrictive banking industry. 
Source: 2009 Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation 
Score Government influence Criteria 
100 Negligible  Independent central bank supervision and regulation of financial institutions 
are limited to enforcing contractual obligations and preventing fraud. 
90 Minimal Independent central bank supervision and regulation of financial institutions 
are minimal but may extend beyond enforcing contractual obligations and 
preventing fraud. 
80 Nominal Independent central bank supervision and regulation of financial institutions 
are minimal but may extend beyond enforcing contractual obligations and 
preventing fraud. Government ownership of financial institutions is a small 
share of overall sector assets. Financial institutions face almost no restrictions 
on their ability to offer financial services. 
70 Limited Credit allocation is slightly influenced by the government, and private 
allocation of credit faces almost no restrictions. Foreign financial institutions 
are subject to few restrictions. 
60 Significant  The central bank is not fully independent, its supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions are somewhat burdensome, and its ability to enforce 
contracts and prevent fraud is insufficient. The government exercises active 
ownership and control of financial institutions with a significant share of 
overall sector assets. The ability of financial institutions to offer financial 
services is subject to some restrictions. 
50 Considerable Credit allocation is significantly influenced by the government, and private 
allocation of credit faces significant barriers. The ability of financial 
institutions to offer financial services is subject to significant restrictions. 
Foreign financial institutions are subject to some restrictions. 
40 Strong  The central bank is subject to government influence, its supervision and 
regulation of financial institutions are heavy, and its ability to enforce 
contracts and prevent fraud is weak. The government exercises active 
ownership and control of financial institutions with a large minority share of 
overall sector assets. 
30 Extensive Credit allocation is extensively influenced by the government. The 
government own or controls a majority of financial institutions or is in a 
dominant position. Financial institutions are heavily restricted, and bank 
formation faces significant barriers. Foreign financial institutions are subject 
to significant restrictions. 
20 Heavy The central bank is not independent, and its supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions are repressive. Foreign financial institutions are 
discouraged or highly constrained. 
10 Near repressive Credit allocation is controlled by the government. Bank formation is 
restricted. Foreign financial institutions are prohibited. 
0 Repressive Supervision and regulation are designed to prevent private financial 
institutions. Private financial institutions are prohibited. 
 
